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16 The Ban on Gaming 
Consoles in China
Protecting National Culture, Morals, 
and Industry within an International 
Regulatory Framework
Bjarke Liboriussen, Andrew White, and 
Dan Wang
From its ‘opening up’ policy in 19781 to the present day, China’s rapid eco-
nomic growth has not only lifted hundreds of millions of its citizens out of 
poverty and made many extremely rich, but it has also been the catalyst 
for immense social transformation. In this chapter, we explore the tension 
between 1) Chinese policymakers’ desire for the wealth that access to global 
markets gives its citizens; and 2) the challenges to Chinese cultural and tra-
ditional ideas about morality that this social transformation brings in its 
wake. Our investigation focuses primarily on the use of one particular case 
that exemplifies this tension: the Chinese government’s 2000 to 2014 ban 
on the importation of foreign-made video game consoles. We first situate the 
ban within the context of China’s international commitments to ‘free trade’ 
and then consider the arguments made for exempting media content from 
such commitments. Here, the Chinese leadership’s ambiguous stance toward 
Western influence is an important policy-shaping factor. For the second half, 
we zoom in on the policy document installing the de facto ban on consoles. 
Here policymakers frame the ban as a way of curbing the negative influence 
of wangbas—Internet cafes—on China’s youth. We discuss whether such a 
move actually resonated with the public and to what extent public concerns 
were constructed rather than reflected by the media. Although a critical 
approach to video game policy should remain skeptical of the motivations 
underlying policy, it also needs to acknowledge the possibility that policy 
responds to actual public concerns, even in a one-party state.
The Ban on the ‘Importation of Electronic Game Equipment 
and Accessories’ and its Impact on China’s WTO Commitments
In 2000, as part of a general crackdown on “places for electronic game busi-
ness,” the Chinese government launched a ban on the sale and  importation 
of “electronic game equipment and accessories” (State Council Office 
2000). Critics have read the ban as economic protectionism, while China 
The Ban on Gaming Consoles in China 231
has argued that it is exerting its right to protect ‘public morals’—a right 
given under international trade agreements —which ties in with its broader 
‘cultural defense’ argument.
The timing of the State Council Office’s announcement was unusual in the 
sense that it came toward the end of the country’s prolonged negotiations 
to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Given the implications for 
global free trade, it would be expected that this particular measure would be 
mentioned in China’s accession documents. While the word ‘console’ does 
not appear in the documents, it can be assumed that it is part of sector 2D 
audiovisual Services: “videos, including entertainment software and (CPC 
83202), distribution services; sound recording distribution services” (WTO 
2001a, 21). Apart from a specific regulation relating to movies, there is one 
stated impediment to unrestricted trade in audiovisual services:
3. Upon accession, foreign services suppliers will be permitted to 
establish contractual joint ventures with Chinese partners to engage 
in the distribution of audiovisual products, excluding motion pictures, 
without prejudice to China’s right to examine the content of audio and 
video products.2 (emphasis added; WTO 2001a, 21)
No mention exists of the blanket prohibition on the sale and importation of 
electronic game equipment (we can assume this includes foreign consoles, 
namely, Nintendo’s Wii, Microsoft’s Xbox and Sony’s PlayStation), even 
though China was required to reveal such measures under the terms of its 
accession (World Trade Organization 2001b, 74–77).
This disjuncture between Chinese domestic law and the restrictive 
 practices that emanate from these legal provisions and China’s obligations 
to the accession documents it signed when it entered the WTO has led to 
a series of disputes with its trading partners. In some cases where there 
are contending interpretations of China’s obligations, the WTO itself has 
had to arbitrate. The WTO’s 2009 ruling on a U.S. complaint that China 
was placing unreasonable restrictions on the importation of audiovisual 
entertainment is particularly pertinent here. China explicitly invoked the 
defense of public morals as justification for these restrictions, emphasizing 
its above-mentioned right under its accession documents to vet the con-
tent of audiovisual products. In addition to this, it cited article XX(a) of 
the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT), which allowed 
member states to take action in defending public morals.
The ruling was reported as constituting a rebuke of China’s restrictive 
practices regarding audiovisual services. However, a closer reading of the 
WTO’s ruling shows that it was not so partial against China but rather 
exemplified the vagueness of the organization’s provisions in relation to 
trade in this sector. Part of the reason for this is that a ‘public morals’ defense 
is clearly allowable under article XIV(a) of the GATT, the protocol that cor-
responds to article XX(a) of GATT (Ibid., 280). Ironically, the WTO panel 
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took its lead from a ruling in a case about gambling regulations wherein the 
U.S. was subject to a complaint triggered by Antigua and Barbuda (Ibid., 
281). While the latter government questioned whether a country (the U.S.) 
where gambling was both legal and widespread could reasonably argue that 
its citizens’ exposure to online gambling could corrupt public morals, the 
validity of the defense itself was upheld (World Trade Organization 2009, 
281). The panel in that particular case ruled that member states themselves 
“should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts 
of ‘public morals’ … in their respective territories, according to their own 
systems and scales of values.”3 For this reason, it was not only the WTO that 
did not challenge China’s right to restrict audiovisual content on the basis of 
defending public morality, but also the U.S. did not question China’s right to 
prevent the importation of audiovisual products that contain content pro-
hibited in that country (World Trade Organization 2009, 286). The U.S.’s 
core argument was that China’s restrictive measures were not an effective 
means of preventing its citizens from being exposed to prohibited content; 
therefore, they were, in the legalese of the documentation, not “necessary” 
(Ibid., 33–34). Essentially, the charge against China was that it was using 
a public morals defense as a means of practicing economic protectionism. 
In the words of the U.S.’s oral statement, China’s measures constituted a 
“disguised restriction on international trade” (Ibid., 33). While the WTO 
largely upheld the U.S.’s complaint by finding that China had not proved 
the “necessity” of their measures in defending its citizens’ public morals, this 
ruling not only did not imperil the country’s right to censor content but also 
did not question its policy of restricting the importation of foreign films to 
no more than 20 per year (Buckley 2009; World Trade Organization 2009, 
466). Although China’s stated focus was on the moral implications of loos-
ening restrictions on imported audiovisual products, many of its arguments 
were culturally inflected. This is evidenced by the way in which morality 
and culture are almost conflated at times. For example, China includes a 
wide range of content, from violence or pornography to other important 
values, including the “protection of the Chinese culture and traditional val-
ues” (emphasis added; World Trade Organization 2009, 279). This attitude 
is also exemplified by Dick Wei of JP Morgan’s response to the WTO ruling 
that foreign companies “really need to understand Chinese culture” (quoted 
in Buckley 2009).
Cultural Protectionism
Until its official ‘opening-up’ in 1978, China’s interaction with foreign 
 culture and with non-Chinese people was extremely limited. Therefore, 
while reform was launched as a means of enabling China to take advantage 
of foreign expertise and global markets, it was still a society ill-prepared 
for the influx of ideas and influences from other parts of the globe. Indeed, 
one of the main arguments against economic reform was that along with 
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the importation of positive ideas and economic goods would come more 
problematic influences from overseas; even the architect of the reforms 
Deng Xiaoping conceded that opening up would let in what he pejoratively 
referred to as ‘flies and insects’ (cited in Gelber 2007, 387). These concerns 
led to the 1983 ‘anti-spiritual pollution’ campaign, which targeted Western 
imports such as pornography, attempting to limit what Chinese authorities 
regarded as the more malignant incursions of foreign culture (Lovell 2011). 
Keane (2007) argues that this campaign was part of a more general program 
of “moral development” or, in the words of key reformers including Deng 
himself, “socialist spiritual civilization” (70). This phrase was useful in two 
respects: 1) it harkened back to pre-modern (more traditional) times in its 
link to popular campaigns against the ailing Qing dynasty at the beginning 
of the twentieth century (Anagnost 1997, 82); and 2) it provided a unifying 
ideology to counter anti-reformers’ arguments that the ‘open door’ policy 
constituted an existential threat to traditional Chinese culture.
Lest people should not get the message, the placing of a cordon sani-
taire of barbed wire around the first four Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 
launched in 1979 to separate them physically from the rest of China (Gelber 
2007, 386) enabled the zones to, in the words of economist Ji Chongwei, act 
as “filters between China’s socialist system and the capitalist world, allow-
ing market mechanisms and the law of value to operate under the guidance 
of socialist planned economy, and taking in positive things and sifting out 
negative aspects of Western culture” (emphasis added; quoted in Gittings 
2005, 219). Further, Deng was keen to signify that opening up to foreign 
trade would not be at the expense of China’s territorial ambitions, as tes-
tified by Deng’s uncompromising stance in the 1984 talks with U.K. Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, which eventually led to the return of Hong 
Kong to the mainland. This trend continued into the early 1990s. After the 
1989 protests and subsequent crackdown, the discrediting of communism 
generally and the Chinese Communist Party’s loss of authority specifically 
meant that the latter sought to reclaim its legitimacy both through the pro-
motion of nationalism (Gelber 2007, 400) and also through assertions that 
Chinese culture is more civilized than Western culture and thus worthy of 
the kind of protection that only the party can provide (Anagnost 1997, 85). 
This manifested itself in 1992 in the official adoption of Deng’s famous for-
mulation “building socialism with Chinese characteristics” (cited in Gittings 
2005, 253), signifying, as it does in other contexts, that even in relation 
to the adoption of universal theories, the Chinese situation is nonetheless 
unique.4 While the SEZs are no longer bounded by barbed wire, the idea 
that the exploitation of Western economic expertise should go hand in hand 
with filtering out Western influences that are viewed inimical to China’s 
cultural and moral development is still prevalent. The 2000 ban should be 
understood within this context.
It would be wrong, though, to take at face value the arguments that either 
China or its culture is unique. Even those who are critical of China tend to 
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use similar arguments to China’s government’s in the sense that they often 
assert that the country is unique in its obsession with protecting its own 
culture. However, many of China’s arguments about the potential for unme-
diated flows of cultural content to harm its culture mirrors those of other 
countries taking part in global trade disputes in the 1990s.
The WTO’s Treatment of Audiovisual Services
Concerns about cultural imperialism animated debates in the 1970s and 
1980s about the most effective means of protecting indigenous media con-
tent, most notably in calls by developing nations for a new world informa-
tion and communication order (NWICO) in the early years of the former 
decade and in UNESCO’s 1980 report by the International Commission for 
the Study of Communication Problems (commonly known as the MacBride 
Report; McQuail 2010, 262). These global debates continued into the latter 
part of the 1980s and 1990s. During Bill Clinton’s presidency from 1993 to 
2001, the U.S. was keen to place international trade in audiovisual services 
under the aegis of global regulatory trade regimes; some argued that this was 
partly motivated by Hollywood’s links with Democrats generally and Clin-
ton’s 1992 campaign in particular (Grant 1995, 1355). This move, though, 
was not popular with most other nations; Canada, for example, prefigured 
future wrangles in securing an opt-out for audiovisual services in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into effect in 1994 
(Thompson 1997, 1). During the 1993 GATT negotiations, the French led 
a European Union fight to keep audiovisual services out of the trade body’s 
jurisdiction. Despite Bill Clinton’s earlier demand that audiovisual services 
must be part of GATT, the U.S. eventually backed down, although the pre-
cise legal status of the ‘cultural exception’ opt-out was unclear (Grant 1995; 
Tomlinson 1997, 128–29). This imprecision was highlighted in a 2006 
WTO case ruling against Canada in relation to ‘split-run’ magazines (of U.S. 
origin but with Canadian versions). Canada was thus inspired to search for 
an international consensus on the protection of “cultural diversity” through 
UNESCO (Grant 2011, 344; Stewart 2010, 37).
These arguments eventually led to the Convention on the Protection 
of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which was ratified by UNESCO 
in 2005 (UNESCO 2005). Like the 1980 International Commission for 
the Study of Communication Problems, it appears to give countries the 
freedom to develop their own national cultural policies, even if they under-
mine global free trade insofar as it relates to cultural goods. The most 
enthusiastic proponents argue that, while it does not affect existing treaty 
obligations, it will likely stop further liberalization of audiovisual services 
(Grant 2011, 348). Others have pointed out that the convention does not 
fundamentally change the existing legal position in relation to the global 
trade in audiovisual services and cannot override prior WTO obligations 
(Burri 2011; Hahn 2006).
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Thus, while China did not make an explicitly cultural case in defending 
itself against the U.S.’s 2007 complaint to the WTO (relying instead on a 
‘public morals’ defense), the logic of the argument was similar to Canada’s 
cultural exception argument from the ‘split-run’ case. The upholding of sig-
nificant parts of the U.S.’s 2007 complaint against China would therefore 
seem to support the contention that, even after the ratification of UNESCO’s 
convention, the WTO continues to subordinate cultural exception asser-
tions to global trade obligations. While it is true that China does not fully 
comply with the stipulation by the 2005 UNESCO convention that its mea-
sures can only work if freedom of expression is guaranteed (Grant 2011, 
347–48), there are nonetheless some troubling aspects of the WTO’s 2009 
ruling against China. Indeed, China’s concerns about the adverse effect of 
digital games on its nation’s youth does appear to have some legitimacy.
Public Morals and the Wangba
The Chinese argument for exempting video games from international free 
trade liberalization hinged on ‘protection of public morals’ but without 
further explanation of that very broad notion. This section unpacks what 
was meant by the ‘protection of public morals,’ in the document, install-
ing the de facto ban on consoles, the State Council’s Circulation of the 
 Ministry of  Culture and other Departments’ Special Regulating Advice on 
 Electronic Game Arcades of June 15, 2000 (hereafter, the 2000 Regulations) 
(State Council Office 2000). We will then be asking two closely related ques-
tions. First, did the concerns raised by the State Council resonate with actual 
concerns of the public whose morals the legislation aimed at protecting? 
Second, to what extent were any public concerns constructed rather than 
reflected by the media? It should be stressed from the outset that we are 
not suggesting that ‘protection of public morals’ is used as a mere pretext 
to ban consoles. Although we show that the console ban is an arbitrary 
extension of measures aimed at cleaning up Internet cafes, we also highlight 
that parts of the public did, and indeed do, see Internet cafes and gaming, 
including console gaming, as inescapably linked. The conceptual and legal 
intertwining of Internet cafes, gaming, and consoles is key to understanding 
the console ban.
The 2000 Regulations’ preamble explains how the State Council—
roughly synonymous with the Chinese government—feels “compelled” to 
act in the face of “public hatred” aimed at the “overflow” of “places for 
electronic game business,” many of which are “illegal and irregular oper-
ations.” The term we translate as “places for electronic game business” 
(电子游戏经营场所written in Pinyin: dianzi youxi jingying changsuo) cap-
tures a broad range of establishments, from gaming arcades in malls to Inter-
net cafes. But there can be no doubt that the main target of the legislation is 
the Internet cafes, or wangbas (网吧). The problem with these places is that 
they “jeopardize the healthy growth of teenagers and massively disturb the 
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social order.” Hence, the State Council proposes a list of “advice” organized 
in nine sections. Table 16.1 summarizes the most relevant of the regulations 
with the ban on consoles to be found under section six. (The main function 
of the omitted material is to specify the division of responsibilities between 
regulatory bodies and to link the 2000 Regulations to socialist ideology.)
 1 Close “places” (read: wangbas) without legal licenses.
 2 Do not license new “places” (read: wangbas).
 3 Criminalize certain activities including
a operating “places” (read: wangbas) closer than 200 meters to primary or 
middle schools.
b admitting minors (national holidays exempt).
c providing “game content [that propagates] obscenity, pornography, supersti-
tion or violence [and/or can be] harmful to consumers’ mental and physical 
health, against public morals, or libelous.”
 5 “Opening time should not be earlier than 8am and later than 12am.”
 6 “All domestic industries involving electronic game equipment, accessories and 
sales are required to cease immediately.” It will be possible to apply for exemp-
tions if “all manufactured products [are sent out of and] sold outside China.” 
“Customs should increase the intensity of inspection and decisively crack 
down on smuggling,” that is, if attempts are made at selling manufactured 
electronic game equipment in China.
Source: [China] State Council Office 2000.
Table 16.1 Summary of the 2000 Regulations
The fact that the 2000 Regulations is the legal underpinning of a de facto 
ban on gaming consoles poses challenges to common sense. The Chinese 
translated here “electronic game equipment” literally means “electronic 
equipment facilitating the playing of games.” The wording is just as sug-
gestive of standard office PCs as it is of gaming consoles, yet the latter are 
targeted. Perhaps more importantly, the explicit purpose of the legislation is 
to tackle problems posed by activities in public places. As gaming consoles 
were not technologically capable of connecting to the Internet at the time of 
the ban, it would make little sense to install them in wangbas.
What sets the Chinese case apart from previous Asian attempts at reg-
ulating video games (see Donovan 2010, chapter 8 in particular) is that 
by the year 2000, gaming had become tied in with other kinds of media 
consumption. Wangbas spread rapidly across China during the latter half of 
the 1990s. A rough estimate suggests that as much as one third of  Chinese 
Internet users relied on wangbas to get online in the year 2000 (Jenkins 
2006, 222), a proportion that remained unchanged during the 2000s (Liu 
2011, 123). Wangbas are places for both Internet use and gaming. The 
social and technological mix of various types of media consumption has 
only deepened as Internet connections have become faster and more stable. 
On entering a wangba in 2014, customers can be found watching movies 
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and TV series (virtually all recent films and TV series can be streamed in 
rather decent quality via Chinese websites), communicating via social media 
sites, instant messaging and e-mail, and playing online games, the latter 
probably being the most popular activity. Social reality is, in the eyes of both 
regulators and parts of the Chinese public, that gaming and wangbas are 
intertwined—a fact that goes some way toward explaining the policy put in 
place, although the ban on consoles remains rather arbitrary.
The 2000 Regulations were not the government’s only effort toward 
slowing the spread of wangbas and cleaning up those allowed to oper-
ate. Chen and Ang (2011) mention regulatory measures taken in the years 
1998, 2001, and 2002 (45f). The 2002 regulations actually repeated some 
of the measures already taken two years before (namely, those mentioned 
in Table 1, Sections 3a and 5). But even if the government could not come 
up with entirely new measures, it might have felt compelled to act and to 
appear determined to act. In June 2002, two boys had been kicked out of 
a Beijing wangba and responded by setting fire to the place. The arson left 
24 or 25 people dead (reports differ), many of whom were teenage students. 
Parents who might already have been adverse to wangbas as places where 
their children would waste their time gaming and surfing the Internet rather 
than studying might now fear for their children’s very lives—and China’s 
one-child policy has only heightened the relative value of a child’s life in a 
 Confucian culture that values the continuation of family very highly. Based 
on 2007 fieldwork in China, Fenshu Liu offers the following characteriza-
tion of Chinese parents’ attitudes toward wangbas:
For many urban parents, the wangba appears like a dark shadow over 
their hearts or a lurking monster ready to spring upon their  children. … 
The image of a desperate and worn-out mother  tracking down her 
teenage child (usually a boy) at the wangba and trying to take him 
back to school is a familiar and worrying one in China. One hears 
about such stories via the media and one runs into such instances in 
daily life.
(Liu 2011, 120)
In China, taking a teenage child ‘back to school’ is not just a question of 
avoiding immediate trouble with a displeased teacher. The child’s long-term 
career might very well depend on the scores obtained during the National 
College Entrance Examinations (Gaokao). These scores determine to which 
higher education institutions the student may apply, and since a degree from 
a prestigious university can be of vital importance for getting a good job, 
Gaokao scores have a very real, long-term effect on a student’s life. Liu’s 
“image of a desperate and worn-out mother tracking down her teenage 
child” stands for real parents with real concerns.
Recent Tencent data suggests that the number of wangbas peaked 
in 2011 and that the number of wangba-goers peaked in 2010 (Game 
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Marketing & User Research Centre 2013). 3G coverage has been spreading 
at a rapid and steady pace, especially since 2006, and this is probably the 
main factor contributing to the current decline. Nevertheless, the conceptual 
link between wangbas and gaming will probably remain strong with the 
Chinese public for years to come. At the time of writing (June 2014), one of 
the contributors to this chapter is conducting a series of focused interviews 
for a project on online gaming cultures in China. The focus of the project 
is financial transactions in connection with online gaming, and interviewees 
are typically born in the early 1990s. Wangbas enter most of the interviews 
unprompted, but interviewees are quick to underscore that they do not fre-
quent wangbas themselves. Instead, they play at home (that is, at their par-
ents’ or in student dormitories). Wangbas are mentioned as places where 
smoking, drinking, and even the taking of drugs occur. It is also mentioned 
that wangbas attract the unemployed and other ‘bored’ people who might 
be tempted to steal from you if given the chance. It is beyond the scope of 
this study to test how reliable these descriptions of wangbas actually are, but 
they do echo widespread assumptions, and the association of wangbas and 
gaming seems to remain strong.
“Electronic Heroin”: Video Games in the Chinese Media
Public concerns over the negative influence of wangbas in general and online 
gaming in particular are reflected by—or perhaps even constructed by—
media coverage; the already mentioned Tencent market research concludes 
that negative press reports contributed to the decline of wangbas (Game 
Marketing & User Research Centre 2013). We would like to draw atten-
tion to Fei Xia’s article, “Computer Games, ‘Electronic Heroin’ Targeting 
Youngsters: Investigations Motivated by a Mother’s Complaint,” as a rep-
resentative and influential example. The article was published on May 9, 
2000 in Guangming Daily, about five weeks before the 2000 Regulations 
came into effect.
Xia’s article is based on visits to both licensed and unlicensed wangbas 
in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province. Wangbas are presented as gaming 
establishments with no other uses of computers or the Internet mentioned. 
Xia estimates that there are 500 licensed gaming arcades and wangbas in 
Wuhan and over 3,000 unlicensed establishments. Unsupported as this claim 
is, it might of course still be close to the actual situation, reflecting a general 
sense of the murky and even dangerous nature of the wangbas. The openly 
operating places are bad enough with children smoking and gaming when 
they should be in school, but who knows what goes on in the  unlicensed 
wangbas, outside of governmental and parental eyes?
Xia pays several visits to unlicensed wangbas and is alarmed to find con-
ditions even worse here: children are even younger, even more obsessed with 
gaming, and there is no one to protect them against the wangba operators 
and owners. The article presents these individuals as beyond contempt. They 
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are reported to offer ‘packages’ to their young customers, consisting of food, 
a few hours’ sleep in bunk beds, and forged parents’ signatures to explain 
school absences—all to allow children to stay in the wangbas for days on 
end. Loyal customers can play on credit, and when their debt runs too high, 
some of it might be forgiven if new addicts (classmates) are lured into the 
wangba. A potential wangba investor interviewed by Xia wants to open shop 
in an area with “several schools nearby,” underscoring the ruthlessness of the 
adults preying on school children (the 2000 ban’s Article 3a criminalizes 
wangbas within 200 meters of schools, see Table 1). In short, Xia attempts to 
construct the wangba owners and operators as scapegoats for the social and 
moral disruptions associated with wangbas, a simplistic move that does not 
seem representative of all Chinese public discourse around wangbas.
Xia’s account of the unlicensed wangbas is not entirely believable.  Factual 
claims are never supported, the key term ‘addiction’ is never explained, and 
in order to become friendly with the young wangba-goers, Xia claims rather 
incredibly that he mastered two complicated computer games, including 
StarCraft (Blizzard 1998), in just one night. Despite these shortcomings, 
Xia’s article helped popularize if not introduce the term ‘electronic her-
oin’ (电子海洛因, written in Pinyin: dianzi hailuoyin). The term has been 
used rather widely since 2000 to characterize games (Li 2002; the author 
acknowledges that some use the term but takes a much more sympathetic 
stance toward gaming). Usage of ‘electronic heroin’ has developed in paral-
lel with technology so that in January 2013, People’s Daily used ‘electronic 
heroin’ to describe mobile phones, stating that 16.2% of teenagers were 
‘addicted’ to the mobile Internet (Zhang 2013). In October 2013, People’s 
Daily used the term even more broadly to describe the Internet, discussing 
‘addiction’ to the Internet in the context of a rapid increase in material living 
conditions (Jin 2013). Although the key term ‘addiction’ remains undefined 
in the journalistic writings just mentioned, games and gaming are not given 
sole responsibility for every perceived problem arising from the young gen-
eration’s new ways of using media. It bears repeating that although simplis-
tic accounts such as Xia’s have contributed to the negative public perception 
of wangbas, such accounts do not stand alone or entirely unchallenged.
Conclusion
Given these popular concerns about gaming, why was the Chinese console 
ban lifted? A straightforward answer would be based on the assumption 
that the ban was never merely crude economic protectionism disguised as 
“cultural exemption” (as suggested by the U.S. government). Chinese legis-
lators might have hoped that keeping American and Japanese consoles out 
of the (legal) Chinese market for 14 years would give its national games 
industry a chance to develop competing products. If that was indeed the 
strategy, the most visible result is Lenovo’s motion-sensor-based gaming 
console, the CT510. Developed by subsidiary company Eedoo and launched 
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in 2012, the CT510 has not exactly taken the world by storm. We have seen 
it in action and found it pretty disappointing compared to its most direct 
competitor, a Kinect-enhanced Xbox. Market statistics are scarce, but we 
have found no indication that the CT510 found a market of considerable 
size. If the console ban was indeed partly motivated by the desire to allow 
a domestic games console industry to flourish, 2014 seems like a perfectly 
rational time to take stock of the experiment—and to end it.
As this article has demonstrated, the ‘economic protectionism’ thesis must 
be supplemented by paying attention to other potential explanations. First, 
the ban did not work. The authors of the 2000 Regulations anticipated this 
by emphasizing the need for increasing the “intensity of inspection and deci-
sively crack down on smuggling” (the 2000 Regulations; see table 1, sec-
tion 6). As an anecdotal illustration, one of us found it very easy to walk into 
a shop in one of Ningbo’s nicer malls in the spring of 2012, find a PlayStation 
3 (smuggled in from Hong Kong) displayed alongside iPhones and other high-
end consumer electronics, and buy the console from English- speaking staff 
who offered excellent after-sales service. Similar experiences are reported by 
journalists and other academics. In other words, the console ban does not 
appear to have restricted the Chinese public’s access to video games.
Second, the Chinese leadership might fear that it alienates an increasingly 
assertive middle class by restricting access to consumer goods. This  concern 
might have outweighed the perceived negative effect on ‘morals.’ This 
accords with Wang’s (2001) argument that in the 1990s, the Chinese gov-
ernment set about creating a ‘leisure culture’ by giving middle class  people 
more opportunities to enjoy their free time on cultural activities and more 
consumer goods to buy in order to reclaim some of the legitimacy that it had 
lost at the end of the previous decade. This was largely successful but over 
time created unreasonable expectations that the party-state ultimately finds 
difficult to satisfy. In this sense, and as previously illustrated, the growing 
middle class will want access not only to the best of Chinese culture but also 
to cultural products from other countries. The size and politico-economic 
power of the contemporary Chinese middle class means that the govern-
ment is increasingly wary of limiting the choice of consumer goods and 
hence might be the reason why a blind eye is turned to the purchasing of 
consoles, making the policy functionally ineffectual.
A third reason might be that the concern over wangbas specifically and 
audiovisual content generally has been superseded by the greater sense of 
threat that the Internet affords to Chinese conceptions of morality. In 2000, 
the year that the console ban was brought in, China had only approxi-
mately 22.5 million Internet users—less than two percent of its population 
(CNNIC 2001, 2). In other words, insofar as Internet use constituted a 
threat to the moral order, it was minimal at the time. However, the num-
ber of Internet users has grown exponentially since then. A 2013 survey 
stated the numbers of users as 590.6 million or 44.1 percent of the total 
population (Pew Research Center 2013). This rise was accompanied by an 
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ever-greater number of restrictions on access (such as the blocking of foreign 
websites), suggesting that as far as the Chinese government is concerned, 
this platform now has the potential for greater harm to Chinese culture and 
public morals than consoles.
The fourth and last rationale we suggest seems superficially counter-intu-
itive. While it might be expected that Chinese commentators would empha-
size their country’s compliance with the WTO’s rules, the sincerity of China’s 
commitment has been underscored by others too. One writer goes as far as 
arguing that as the Bush administration fell back on bilateralism in trade 
negotiations in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, it 
was the Chinese who kept the flame of multilateralism alight (Arrighi 2007, 
208). While there is no definitive proof that lifting the console ban was a 
direct result of the WTO’s 2009 ruling against China, it could be read as 
consistent with its desire to be seen to be ‘playing by the rules,’ which it had 
done at accession in “agree[ing] to one of the fastest programs of import 
duty cuts and market opening ever accepted by a member … [China] met 
the deadlines and passed the laws” (Winn 2005; quoted in Arrighi 2007, 
277). This occurred despite other countries, including the U.S., imposing 
restrictions on its exports (Ibid., 277–78). Indeed, Toohey (2011) argues 
that there is an extent to which China’s desire to project its soft power 
means that it is unwilling to be seen as too obstructionist and hence has 
largely met the obligations of its membership to the WTO (798). It might 
be that the lifting of the console ban could be viewed in that light: a largely 
symbolic but highly visible concession of a measure that long ago proved 
ineffectual in order to mask the ongoing control of what the government 
considers are more potent threats like the Internet.
Notes
 1. This refers to China’s long-term move away from its isolationist economic strategy.
 2. The GATT was an earlier series of global trade negotiations, whose agreements 
were codified in the WTO when the latter was formed on January 1, 1995 
(WTO 2014).
 3. WTO 2005, para. 6.141; cited in WTO 2009, 280.
 4. Indeed, the appending of the phrase “with Chinese characteristics” to a varied 
range of socio-political situations is employed uncritically not only by Chinese 
officials but also by many Chinese academics too.
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